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The paper explores Hermann Weyl’s turn to intuitionism through a philosophical prism of 
normative framework transitions. It focuses on three central themes that occupied Weyl’s 
thought: the notion of the continuum, logical existence, and the necessity of intuitionism, 
constructivism, and formalism to adequately address the foundational crisis of mathematics. 
The analysis of these themes reveals Weyl’s continuous endeavor to deal with such 
fundamental problems and suggests a view that provides a different perspective concerning 
Weyl’s wavering foundational positions. Building on a philosophical model of scientific 
framework transitions and the special role that normative indecision or ambivalence plays in 
the process, the paper examines Weyl’s motives for considering such a radical shift in the first 
place. It concludes by showing that Weyl’s shifting stances should be regarded as symptoms of 




Hermann Weyl’s engagement with the foundations of mathematics began in 1910 when he first 
started to consider constructive methods as a solid opponent to classical mathematics 
(Beisswanger 1965; Scholz 2000). His philosophical views played a major role in the 
development of his inclination towards constructive approaches, and later towards Brouwer’s 
intuitionistic ideas (Scholz 2004; Sieroka 2009, 2019). Weyl was deeply influenced by Kant’s 
notion of the primacy of intuition, and even though he cannot be described as a true idealist 
(since his metaphysical outlook included some realistic aspects, (Bell and Korté 2015)), he did, 
during 1912, find philosophical enlightenment in Husserl’s phenomenology and Fichte’s 
metaphysical idealism. Brouwer was also interested in the philosophy of mathematics and 
dedicated the second chapter of his dissertation to improving Kant’s view of the a priori 
(Brouwer 1907). The force behind Brouwer’s philosophical agenda was Gerrit Mannoury, whose 
lectures revealed to Brouwer that mathematics was not a realm that existed independently of 
human beings, but rather a human creation. This was in accordance with Brouwer’s idealistic 
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philosophy and set the ground for Brouwer’s choice of research subject (van Dalen 1999; 
Mannoury 1909).  
It should be noted that Weyl’s idealism and Brouwer’s idealism were quite different: Brouwer’s 
philosophy amounted virtually to solipsism, while Weyl still seemed to have cleaved to 
phenomenology (Mancosu and Ryckman 2002). Nevertheless, this common philosophical 
ground (specifically their shared view about the primary intuition of time) have contributed to 
Weyl’s inclination towards intuitionism.  
The publication of Das Kontinuum (Weyl 1918) marked the emergence of Weyl’s commitment 
to constructivism, but less than three years later, it transformed into an intuitionistic approach 
that was expressed in his renowned paper “On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics” 
(Weyl 1921). Weyl was critical of Cantor’s set-theoretical foundations of mathematics not only 
on the grounds of its arising paradoxes but mostly because Cantor’s set theory addressed the 
subject matter of mathematics as abstract entities that exist independently of human thought. 
Weyl, on the other hand, viewed the natural number system as a human conception and 
insisted on working with explicit definitions of sets and functions (Feferman 1998); Brouwer’s 
intuitionistic program, which was based on mathematical objects as constructions of the human 
mind, had therefore attracted Weyl’s attention.  
However, during the 1920s, Weyl gradually shifted his foundational stance away from 
intuitionism, possibly due to the mathematical sacrifices required in order to achieve the 
mathematical stability intuitionism had proposed. He found the intuitionistic approach 
“awkward” (Weyl 1949, 54) and intolerable for practicing mathematicians (van Dalen 1995). In 
the mid-1920s Weyl retreated from intuitionism and re-approached Hilbert’s axiomatic 
program (Beisswanger 1965; van Dalen 1995). Notwithstanding, Weyl’s later works show that 
he never fully accepted Hilbert’s program, and continued to waver between constructive, 
intuitionistic, and axiomatic approaches to the foundational problem throughout his life.  
Solomon Feferman described at least two additional changes of heart vis-à-vis constructivism 
that emerged in Weyl’s later works: one in the late 1930s, when he restated the importance of 
his early constructive views as essential to the process of forming a solution to the foundational 
problem, and another in his 1953 lecture where he described himself as being torn between 
constructivity and axiomatics (Feferman 1998). The lecture, titled “Axiomatic versus 
constructive procedures in mathematics”, ended with the following words: 
"Indeed my own heart draws me to the side of constructivism. Thus it cost me some 
effort to follow the opposite direction, putting axiomatics before construction, but 
justice seemed to require this from me." (Weyl 1953, 38) 
Historians and philosophers of mathematics have overtly noticed Weyl’s frequent changes of 
heart regarding the foundational crisis. Feferman claimed that “we all change our minds, or 
most of us do, about things over periods of time and Weyl was certainly no exception“ 
(Feferman 2000, 181). Erhard Scholz suggests that Weyl’s “intellectual moves” during the 1920s 
derived from his philosophical considerations, which were rooted in Fichte’s construction of the 
concept of space and matter (Scholz 2000). Norman Sieroka explains the fluctuation of Weyl’s 
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positions regarding formalism, intuitionism, and constructivism as closely related to the 
developments in his philosophical views, namely, the separation he made between Husserlian 
phenomenology and Fichtean constructivism (Sieroka 2009). However, such accounts only 
address part of the story, as they make no attempt to explain either Weyl’s motivations for 
changing his mind or the roots of his undecidedness. 
To do justice to Weyl’s story, I will address the broader philosophical issues of normative 
framework transitions and try to explain how practitioners expound new alternatives. First, I 
will focus on three central themes that occupied Weyl’s thought: the problematic 
differentiation between the intuitive and the mathematical continuum, the notion of logical 
existence, and the necessity of intuitionism, constructivism, and formalism to adequately 
address the foundational crisis of mathematics. The analysis of these themes will reveal Weyl’s 
continuous endeavor to deal with such fundamental problems. Afterwards, building on 
Menachem Fisch’s model of scientific framework transitions and the special role that normative 
indecision or ambivalence plays in the process (Fisch 2017; Fisch and Benbaji 2011), I will 
examine Weyl’s motives for considering such a radical shift in the first place, and I will show 
that Weyl’s constant changes of heart in regards to the foundations of mathematics were only 
symptoms of a deeper, intrasubjective process of self-criticism induced by exposure to external 
normative criticism. 
 
2. The undecided nature of Weyl’s thought 
2.1 The concept of the continuum 
In Das Kontinuum, Weyl presented a semi-constructive alternative to the set-theoretic basis of 
the full real number system ℝ. Though he perceived it as a suitable alternative to those 
suggested by Dedekind, Cantor, Weierstrass, and Hilbert, Weyl was fully aware of the 
difficulties arising from his approach,1 specifically regarding what he saw as the unbridgeable 
gap between the continuum given by intuition (of space, time and motion) and its 
mathematical representation as a “discrete” exact concept (that of the real number).  
Weyl described the discrepancy between an intuitively given continuum (he referred to time as 
the most fundamental continuum) and the concept of number in §6 of the second chapter in 
Das Kontinuum: 
“For example, I see this pencil lying before me on the table throughout a certain period 
of time. This observation entitles me to assert that during a certain period this pencil 
was on the table; and even if my right to do so is not absolute, it is nonetheless 
reasonable and well grounded. It is obviously absurd to suppose that this right can be 
undermined by an "expansion of our principles of definition" - as if new moments of 
time, overlooked by my intuition, could be added to this interval, moments in which the 
pencil was, perhaps, in the vicinity of Sirius or who knows where. If the temporal 
 
1 As Weyl himself stated, “The intuitive continuum and the world of mathematical concepts are so distant from 
each other that the demand that both coincide has to be rejected as absurd.” (Weyl 1918, 83). 
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continuum can be represented by a variable which "ranges over" the real numbers, then 
it appears to be determined thereby how narrowly or widely we must understand the 
concept "real number" and the decision about this must not be entrusted to logical 
deliberations over principles of definition and the like.” (Weyl 1918, 87–88)  
Throughout his attempt to analyze the continuous nature of time, Weyl struggled with the 
transition from what is intuitively present (such as a pencil lying on the table for a certain 
period), to a description of a time-period consisting of individual time-points (namely, replacing 
“a certain period” with “every time-point which falls within a certain time span”). The latter is 
simply not intuitive anymore. Finally, he concluded that exact time points are not the 
underlying elements of time, as given to us by experience. Within the intuitive continuum, 
“the exhibition of a single point is impossible. Further, points are not individuals and, 
hence, cannot be characterized by their properties. (Whereas the "continuum" of the 
real numbers consists of genuine individuals, that of the time- or space-points is 
homogeneous.)” (Weyl 1918, 94) 
The section ends with the underlying statement that the intuitive and the mathematical 
continuum are comprised of fundamentally different elements; thus, the two entities cannot 
coincide.  
Less than two years later, Weyl published “On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics” 
(Weyl 1921), which embodied a perspective on the continuum very different from the one 
presented in his preceding works. Here, Weyl repudiated his interpretation of the continuum in 
Das Kontinuum, which he referred to as “atomistic” or “discrete”, because it derived from a 
false belief that individual points constitute the continuum and that each point is independent 
when taken by itself (Weyl 1921, 94).  
The new interpretation which he welcomes is Brouwer’s intuitive construction of the 
continuum, as Weyl felt that Brouwer was the only one close enough to bridge the “chasm” 
between the intuitive and mathematical continua (Bell 2000). As such, it builds upon a 
completely different conception of the real numbers. Real numbers are no longer represented 
as individual points; a real number x is represented by a “dual interval”, an interval stretching 
from the number y to the number z and containing x in it.2 He wrote 
“The concept of real number, as a number that is given only approximatively, yet one for 
which the degree of approximation can be pushed beyond any limit is thus to be 
formulated simply as: a real number is an infinite sequence of dual intervals i, i’, i’’, … 
such that every interval of the sequence fully contains in its inside the next following 
one.” (Weyl 1921, 93) 
Weyl introduced two additional concepts associated with his new notion of the real number: 
sequences and laws. Both are used to define the relationship between the new individual real 
numbers and the new concept of the continuum: 
 
2 Weyl presents a formal representation of those numbers in his paper (Weyl 1921, 93), which is not very relevant 
for the purpose of this argument. 
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“The individual real number is represented by a law 𝜑 that determines a sequence in 
infinitum, while the continuum is represented by the choice sequence unrestricted by 
any law in the freedom of its development.” (Weyl 1921, 94) 
A genuine continuum, according to Weyl, cannot be divided into separate fragments since the 
true nature of the continuum demands that every part of it can be further divided without 
limitation (Weyl 1921, 115). The continuum in the traditional analysis was defined as a set of its 
points, the points being fundamental elements in the set. Each point was a part of the set, such 
that the traditional continuum could be divided into parts, but this was as far as one could go 
with such division since a point is considered a part that does not contain any further parts. By 
redefining primary elements of the construction of the real numbers as intervals rather than 
points, the mathematical continuum can finally be “in harmony” with the intuitive one. The 
chasm that represented the unbridgeable difference between the intuitive and the 
mathematical continuum in Das Kontinuum reappears now as the gulf between the new 
mathematical continuum and a set of discrete elements (Weyl 1921, 95).  
Several years later, in “Philosophy of mathematics and natural sciences” Weyl addressed the 
problem of the continuum as an open question that has not been properly attended yet. In this 
book, Weyl presented his philosophical approach to mathematics, quoting Anaxagoras to 
support his claim of the continuous continuum:  
“The essential character of the continuum is clearly described in this fragment due to 
Anaxagoras: ‘Among the small there is no smallest, but always something smaller. For 
what is cannot cease to be no matter how far it is being subdivided’. The continuum is 
not composed of discrete elements which are ‘separated from one another as though 
chopped off by a hatchet’.” (Weyl 1949, 41) 
The puzzling nature of the continuum and the problems surrounding its mathematical 
representation continued to occupy Weyl’s thoughts. In his paper “Axiomatic and Constructive 
Procedures in Mathematics” written in 1954, he still grappled with the “riddle of the 
continuum” and regarded it as a “serious affair” that has not yet been resolved (Weyl 1954).  
 
2.2 Logical Existence 
The first chapter in Das Kontinuum engages with core concepts such as “judgement”, 
“category”, “proposition”, and possible relations between them (Weyl 1918, 5–9). Throughout 
the chapter Weyl forms six “complex judgment schemes” (Weyl 1918, 10) in order to explain 
logical notions like “and”, “or”, logical negations, and the concept of logical existence. For 
example: 
 “[…] If F(xy) means "x is the father of y" and accordingly, F(Iy) means "I am the father of 
y", then F(I*) means "There is someone of whom I am the father", that is, "I am a 
father."” (Weyl 1918, 11) 
Judgement statements such as "Every object has such and such a property" and "There is no 
object which lacks the relevant property" are deemed equivalent in Das Kontinuum (Weyl 1918, 
12). It is tacitly pre-supposed that a combination of existence judgement and negation (e.g., 
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“there is no object that…”) is fully interchangeable with universal statements such as “all” or 
“every” (Weyl 1918, 12–13).   
The picture presented in “On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics” (Weyl 1921) reveals 
quite a different theory. Building on the new interpretation of the continuum as an entity that 
can be divided without limitation, the concept of mathematical existence was utterly reformed. 
In order to deduce from the statement “there is someone of whom I am the father” that “I am 
a father”, one must be able to produce a witness: a child of his. Once the witness is produced, 
the inference is justified; but if one is unable to produce a witness, existence judgement such as 
“there is someone” is meaningless. He wrote 
“An existential statement – say, ‘there exists an even number’ – is not at all a judgement 
in the strict sense, which claims a state of affairs. Existential states of affairs are empty 
inventions of logicians. ‘2 is an even number’: This is an actual judgement expressing a 
state of affairs; ‘there is an even number’ is merely a judgement abstract gained from 
this judgement. If knowledge is a precious treasure, then the judgement abstract is a 
piece of paper indicating the presence of a treasure, yet without revealing at which 
place. Its only value can be to drive me on to look for the treasure. The piece of paper is 
worthless as long as it is not realized by an underlying actual judgement like ‘2 is an 
even number’.” (Weyl 1921, 97–98) 
In “Philosophy of mathematics and natural sciences” Weyl differentiated between two types of 
logic: a finite one and a transfinite one. Finite logic uses logical notions such as “and”, “or”, and 
“not”, whereas transfinite logic also includes existence judgements such as “all” and “there is”. 
He wrote 
 “That part of logic which operates exclusively with the logical connectives 'not,' 'and,' 
'or' will be referred to as finite logic, as opposed to transfinite logic, which in addition 
uses the propositional operators 'some' (or 'there is') and 'all'. The reason for this 
subdivision is as follows. Suppose several pieces of chalk are lying in front of me; then 
the statement 'all these pieces of chalk are white' is merely an abbreviation of the 
statement 'this piece is white & that piece is white & …' (where each piece is being 
pointed at in turn), Similarly 'there is a red one among them' is an abbreviation of 'this is 
red v that is red v ... ' But only for a finite set, whose elements can be exhibited 
individually, is such an interpretation feasible. In the case of infinite sets, the meaning of 
'all' and 'some' involves a profound problem which touches upon the core of 
mathematics, the very secret of the infinite.” (Weyl 1949, 13–14)   
Within the finite set, Weyl redefined logic as comprised of two logics and identified transfinite 
logic with existential and universal judgments. In order to deduce existence from an existence 
statement, it is no longer mandatory to provide a witness within a finite set, since one can 
eventually be found by pointing out each object. The same procedure applies for universal 
quantifiers since, within finite sets, each object can be accounted for. However, upon 
considering infinite sets, the latter no longer holds; existence statements, as well as universal 
quantifiers, again receive the status of problematic at best and meaningless at worst. This 
approach to logic, specifically within the delimiter of finite and infinite sets, indicates that Weyl 
 
 7 
maintained his ideas from 1921 about logical existence and the problematic aspect of “there is” 
statements, but also that he accepted the validity of “there is” statements in some realms of 
logic (namely, those that address finite sets); a relatively moderated approach than the one he 
presented in 1921.  
In later works, the differentiation between finite and transfinite logic within finite sets 
disappeared, and instead, Weyl used the terms finite and infinite logic to emphasize the 
differences he saw between two opposing mathematical views: one that consists primarily of 
construction, and another that subordinates construction to axioms and deduction. He wrote 
 “If carried so far, the issue between explicit construction and implicit definition by 
axioms ties up with the last foundations of mathematics. Evidence based on 
construction refuses to support the principles of Aristotelian logic when these are 
applied to existential and general propositions in infinite fields like the sequence of 
integers or a continuum of points. And if the logic of the infinite is taken into account, it 
seems impossible to axiomatize adequately even the most primitive process, the 
transition n -> n' from an integer n to its follower n'. As K. Gödel has shown, there will 
always be constructively evident arithmetical propositions which can not be deduced 
from the axioms however you formulate them, while at the same time the axioms, 
riding roughshod over the subtleties of the constructive infinite, go far beyond what is 
justifiable by evidence.” (Weyl 1940, 446). 
Here Weyl described two completely different logics: the Aristotelian logic used by the 
axiomatic approach and the logic of the infinite that is applied in constructive methods. When 
considering existence statements in infinite sets, it is only the “logic of the infinite” (i.e., 
Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic) that comes closest to a true mathematical representation of our 
intuition, according to Weyl.  
Weyl had never come to terms with the question of whether mathematics can adequately 
portray what is given to us by experience (Weyl 1951). The problematic aspects he explicitly 
pointed out, such as logic existence statements and the concept of the continuum, remained an 
open question to him, since he felt that neither constructivism nor formalism were able to 
properly dissolve the tendencies between mathematics and our phenomenological sense of the 
world.  
 
2.3 Being an intuitionist, a formalist, or a constructivist? 
Aside from “On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics”, Weyl engaged with intuitionism 
twice more during the 1920s: in 1924 when he presented a constructive proof of the 
fundamental theorem of algebra, and in 1928 as a response to Hilbert’s attack on intuitionism 
during a seminar talk in Hamburg (van Dalen 1995, 163). The Hamburg symposium note, in 
which he stated that “in the epistemological evaluation of the new situation thus created, 
nothing separates me any longer now from Hilbert” (van Dalen 1995, 164), marks Weyl’s 
gradual dissociation from intuitionism which had begun during 1926-1927 (Mancosu and 
Ryckman 2002).  
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Weyl was always aware of the problematic aspects of Brouwer’s intuitionism. Even in an 
advocating paper such as “On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics”, Weyl addressed 
intuitionism with a grain of salt. He wrote 
“The new conception, as one can see, brings with it far-reaching restrictions with 
respect to the generality that enthusiastically leads into vagueness and that we have 
become used to through traditional analysis. We must learn again to be modest. With 
the intention to storm the heavens, we merely piled up mists upon mists, unable to 
support anyone who was seriously trying to stand upon them. What remained tangible 
might, at first glance, appear so insignificant that the possibility of analysis could 
generally be put into question. This pessimism, however, is ill-founded, as will be shown 
in the next section. Yet we must firmly and with all energy hold on to the fact that 
mathematics is through and through, even as concerns the logical forms in which it 
moves, dependent on the nature of natural numbers.” (Weyl 1921, 109)  
On a less optimistic note, Weyl elaborated on the implications of such restrictions on the 
mathematical discipline as a whole: 
“Mathematics with Brouwer gains its highest intuitive clarity. He succeeds in developing 
the beginnings of analysis in a natural manner, all the time preserving the contact with 
intuition much more closely than had been done before. It cannot be denied, however, 
that in advancing to higher and more general theories the inapplicability of the simple 
laws of classical logic eventually results in an almost unbearable awkwardness. And the 
mathematician watches with pain the larger part of his towering edifice which he 
believed to be built of concrete blocks dissolve into mist before his eyes.” (Weyl 1949, 
54) 
In its entirety, Brouwer’s intuitionistic theory obliged its adherents to forfeit core mathematical 
notions while embracing completely different, sometimes even contradicting3, alternatives. 
Whereas Brouwer was willing to eschew fundamental classical theorems and accept the 
invalidity of principle concepts in calculus (Brouwer 1912, 1918; van Stigt 1990), Weyl felt that 
intuitionistic ideas are of little relevance to mundane mathematical practice, avowing that 
everyday mathematical theorems are not affected by his new intuitionistic contemplations. In a 
draft of Weyl’s 1921 paper, he remarked that 
“It should be stressed once more that certain individual functions of that kind [functio 
continua] occur occasionally in mathematics, that general theorems are, however, never 
asserted about them. The general formulation of these notions is therefore required 
only if one is giving a justification of the meaning and methods of mathematics; for 
itself, the subject matter of its theorems, it is never considered at all”. (van Dalen 1995, 
148–49)  
 
3 Aside from refining the classical-set theoretic picture, Brouwer’s new intuitionistic mathematics also occasionally 
contradicted classical mathematics, as in its denial that there are any fully defined discontinuous functions (for 
details see (Posy 2005)). 
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Nevertheless, Weyl was reluctant to commit to Hilbert’s formalistic approach. From Weyl’s 
point of view, Hilbert’s formalization of set theory amounted to reducing mathematics to 
formal logical systems that can be described objectively without reference to their intended 
meaning, an approach that Weyl perceived as a degradation of mathematics: 
“Hilbert’s mathematics may be a pretty game with formulae, more amusing even than 
chess; but what bearing does it have on cognition, since its formulae admittedly have no 
material meaning by virtue of which they could express intuitive truths? The subject of 
mathematical investigation, according to Hilbert, is the concrete symbols themselves. It 
is without irony, therefore, when Brouwer says ‘To the question where shall 
mathematical rigor be found, the two parties give different answers. The intuitionist 
says: in the human intellect, the formalist: on paper’.” (Weyl 1949, 61)  
Neither Hilbert’s formalism nor Brouwer’s intuitionism were able to adequately rebuild the 
foundations of mathematics as Weyl saw fit. In his 1925 paper “The current epistemological 
situation in mathematics”, Weyl claimed that both are necessary for a comprehensive 
understanding of mathematics. He concluded 
“[…] it is certainly greatly beneficial that Brouwer had strengthened again the sense in 
mathematics for the intuitively given. His analysis expresses in a pure manner the 
content of the mathematical basic intuition and is therefore shone through by clarity 
without mystery. Yet beside Brouwer’s way, one will also have to pursue that of Hilbert; 
for it is undeniable that there is a theoretical need simply incomprehensible from the 
merely phenomenal point of view, with a creative urge directed upon the symbolic 
representation of the transcendent, which demands to be satisfied”. (Weyl 1925, 141) 
Even though the ultimate foundations and meaning of mathematics remained an open problem 
for Weyl, he saw a mid-way solution between Hilbertian formalism and constructive methods in 
the form of “dextrous blending”: an amalgam of Hilbert’s axiomatic approach to mathematics 
in algebra (championed by Bourbaki) and constructive procedures in other mathematical fields 
such as topology and geometry (Weyl 1954).  
Weyl did not regard intuitionism, constructivism, and formalism as clearly delineated theories. 
He noted that the borderlines of Brouwer’s mathematics are vague, and some of Hilbert’s 
mathematical considerations that appear to be evident, are not always entirely evident (Weyl 
1953). Thus, he was not only concerned with questions regarding the subject matter of the 
theory itself (e.g., which definition of the continuum corresponds better with intuition?). He 
was also concerned with questions about what it means to be a formalist, a constructivist, or an 
intuitionist (e.g., What are the implications of building the foundations of mathematics solely 
on intuitionism\formalism\constructivism? Does such mathematics remain useful?). 
Weyl is often described by historians and philosophers of mathematics as a “wanderer” (Scholz 
2004, 1), who was traveling amid mathematical approaches and through philosophical fields. 
His retreat from Brouwer’s ideas was portrayed as becoming “disillusioned” (Rosello 2012, 
147), and Solomon Feferman argued that when we talk about Weyl’s foundational views, we 
are faced with shifting positions (Feferman 2000). The analysis of Weyl’s stances regarding 
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logical existence, the continuum, and the underlying meaning of being an intuitionist, a 
formalist, or a constructivist, shows more than a mere change of mind; it depicts Weyl’s 
consistent attempt to reconcile (what he felt was) the intuitive nature of mathematics with the 
common, everyday use of mathematical practice without losing one to the other.  
In the remainder of the paper, I wish to enhance the standard view held by historians and 
philosophers of mathematics and suggest that Weyl’s indecisive acts are symptomatic of 
profound intrapersonal deliberations. By considering how normative transitions occur in 
general, and more specifically, by concentrating on the process of exposure to external criticism 
that is both normative and self-directed, the following sections of this paper seek to shed a 
different light on Weyl’s innate motivations and hesitant stances.   
3. Towards a philosophical approach of normative transitions 
The question of how can someone deem his own standards of propriety as normatively 
improper in a rational manner has puzzled the philosopher Menachem Fisch for decades. In his 
recent works (Fisch 2017; Fisch and Benbaji 2011) Fisch has proposed a theory about the 
possibility of rationally changing our normative commitments, in which he claims that by 
intrasubjective deliberations alone we are unable to reach the self-critical lines and cannot 
rationally change our standards. However, and here lies the novelty of his argument, exposure 
to the echo chambers of normative criticism coming from outside, from people who are 
committed to different frameworks, could have a destabilizing impact. Or, to use Fisch's 
expression, to ambivalate. 
Fisch has observed that practitioners of standing are liable, when normatively ambivalated, to 
produce curiously split and hybrid accounts of the foundations of their field in an attempt to 
breed a newly found undecidedness. Examples for Fisch’s theory are the stories of Tycho 
Brahe’s grafting of a heliocentric planetary system on a basically geocentric cosmology, 
Galileo’s theory of free fall and projectile motion, as well as George Peacock’s two-fold account 
on algebra. Even though the mature works of Brahe, Galileo, and Peacock are confident 
presentations of the positions to which they were fully committed, it is their halfway positions 
and intermediary frameworks (often unpublished thus concealed from the public eye) that 
paved their paths. The fact that Tycho, Galileo, and Peacock were able to form and maintain 
such halfway positions, negotiating between the prevailing theory on the one hand and their 
new ideas on the other, shows that they had become sufficiently ambivalent towards their own 
normative frameworks (Fisch and Benbaji 2011, 295–96).   
Fisch’s concept of ambivalence refers to a delicate moment in the history of scientific 
transformations, a moment that can be easily overlooked or dismissed as mere confusion or 
indecision when analyzed without proper attention. He writes: 
“What makes such figures indispensable to the deeply transformative moments in 
which they partook, and, hence, to the latter-day historian, is the way their initial 
ambivalence was captured in their Solomonic attempts to split their subject matter in 
the hybrid manner described. Carefully analyzed, pried apart at their (usually) rough 
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seams, and properly reenacted, such doubles and splits offer historians much toward 
recapitulating the destabilized mindset of their authors. But only if read and analyzed 
prospectively, as history is lived and should be studied, as acts of anxious and urgent 
engagement, rather than retrospectively, as mere intermediate stations between one 
stable framework and the next; as fossilized normative dilemmas, as it were, preserving 
for posterity frozen, ossified snapshots of tortured, creative indecision. For they are too 
often written off as unimaginative first tries, or as the work of confused reactionary 
rearguarding.” (Fisch 2010, 536–37) 
Notably important is the difference between ambivalence and persuasion. To render someone 
ambivalent towards one or more of his normative standards does not necessarily mean to 
convince him of their unseemliness. Practitioners can become ambivalent towards a theory 
without being convinced that the prevailing theory is improper. Once exposed to the normative 
criticism of others, the stage of ambivalence can last months, years, or even a lifetime, during 
which practitioners are on the lookout for new alternatives without dismissing the old ones. 
Moreover, ambivalated practitioners often feel torn between the two stances, since 
“normative ambivalence amounts to being of two minds with respect to certain 
elements of one's normative framework; a form of indecisive dithering with respect to 
those elements. To the remainder of their framework (the part of their I-part to which 
they have not become ambivalent) such "ambivalated" individuals remain 
wholeheartedly committed.” (Fisch 2010, 537) 
Fisch’s model of normative transformations introduces two insights about the concept of 
“becoming ambivalent” that are of significance to Weyl’s story:  
(1) Ambivalence can sometimes be misinterpreted as indecision or confusion. 
(2) Ambivalence does not necessarily imply abandonment of old commitments, nor a 
complete acceptance of new ones. 
The story so far gives rise to the question of how does a practitioner deal with his own 
ambivalence. Does he attempt to settle his indecision by turning his back on one of the theories 
he is torn between? Must the ambivalence be eventually resolved, or can one self-deliberate 
with his own indecision throughout his life? The following section will examine how Weyl 
addressed his own ambivalence, as well as how mathematicians, philosophers, and historians of 
mathematics viewed it.    
 
4. Ambivalated from within (How did Weyl deal with his own ambivalence?) 
Weyl’s changing views about the foundations of mathematics were shaped, to a large extent, 
by his exposure to the echo chambers of several practitioners and groups of mathematicians. 
The French semi-intuitionists’ criticism of Cantor’s set theory and Zermelo’s axiom of choice 
(Hesseling 2003; Moore 1982) have influenced Weyl’s foundational viewpoint as can be seen 
both in Weyl’s 1910 paper on the definition of fundamental mathematical concepts (namely, 
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definable relations) and in Das Kontinuum (Feferman 1998). In the 1918 preface to Das 
Kontinuum, Weyl describes his then-promising half-way solution: a constructive approach to 
the foundations of mathematics that will avoid the “vicious circle” of Russell’s paradoxes and 
Cantor’s set theory and its dangerous implications. He wrote:  
 
 “It is not the purpose of this work to cover the "firm rock" on which the house of 
analysis is founded with a fake wooden structure of formalism – a structure which can 
fool the reader and, ultimately, the author into believing that it is the true foundation. 
Rather, I shall show that this house is to a large degree built on sand. I believe that I can 
replace this shifting foundation with pillars of enduring strength. They will not, however, 
support everything which today is generally considered to be securely grounded. I give 
up the rest, since I see no other possibility.” (Weyl 1918, 1) 
Even though Weyl was not a professional philosopher, he was attracted to idealist philosophy, 
and the latter played a significant role in his foundational thought. When Weyl was a student of 
mathematics in Gottingen, he attended lectures by Husserl, and during his Zurich years, he was 
introduced to Fichte’s philosophical views, much due to the encouragement of his friend and 
colleague, Fritz Medicus, who was also a professor of idealist philosophy at ETH (Scholz 2004; 
Sieroka 2007, 2009). The influence of both Husserl and Fichte on Weyl presents itself in Das 
Kontinuum, as Weyl specifically addressed Husserl’s philosophical stance in the book’s preface:  
“Although this is primarily a mathematical treatise, I did not avoid philosophical 
questions and did not attempt to dispose of them by means of that crude and superficial 
amalgamation of empiricism and formalism which still enjoys considerable prestige 
among mathematicians (even though it is attacked with gratifying clarity in Frege 
(1893). Concerning the epistemological side of logic, I agree with the conceptions which 
underlie Husserl (1913a). The reader should also consult the deepened presentation in 
Husserl (1913b) which places the logical within the framework of a comprehensive 
philosophy. Our examination of the continuum problem contributes to critical 
epistemology's investigation into the relations between what is immediately (intuitively) 
given and the formal (mathematical) concepts through which we seek to construct the 
given in geometry and physics.” (Weyl 1918, 2) 
At the outset of the discussion on judgement and property in the first chapter of Das 
Kontinuum, Weyl acknowledged the expertise of metaphysical philosophers, such as Fichte, 
that is essential in order to achieve a clear definition of what judgement is. He wrote: 
“We cannot set out here in search of a definitive elucidation of what it is to be a state of 
affairs, a judgment, an object, or a property. This task leads into metaphysical depths. 
And concerning it one must consult men, such as Fichte, whose names may not be 
mentioned among mathematicians without eliciting an indulgent smile4.” (Weyl 1918, 7) 
 
4 According to Norman Sieroka, the mathematician’s “indulgent smile” refers to the fact that Fichte was a gifted 
philosopher but not quite as good a mathematician (Sieroka 2009).  
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Much like his foundational stances, Weyl's philosophical views were also subject to changes. In 
a lecture delivered in 1954 titled "Insight and Reflection", Weyl portrayed his long philosophical 
voyage that begun with Kant, then went on to idealist phenomenology, and ended with Weyl's 
recognition that the latter entails several problematic aspects (Weyl 1955). Considering these 
issues, Weyl modified his philosophical approach, which became closer to Cassirer in some 
aspects5, and in other aspects to theologists such as Meister Eckhart (Bell 2004). According to 
Erhard Scholz, even the deep inspiration of Fichte's ideas on Weyl's thoughts had faded over 
the years, and Weyl's late reflections indicate that he became closer to Heidegger's 
existentialist or Gonseth's dialectical philosophies in the late 1940s (Scholz 2004). 
The mathematician Henri Poincare also played a significant role in forming Weyl’s foundational 
as well as philosophical viewpoint. The impact of Poincare’s philosophy of mathematics, 
specifically his position regarding impredicative definitions and the concept of existence and 
potential infinity (Poincare 1963), is present in Weyl’s 1918 works. Solomon Feferman argues 
that in Das Kontinuum, Weyl accepted a significant part of Poincare’s definitionist philosophy, 
including Poincare’s conception of the natural number and the idea that there are no 
completed infinite totalities (Feferman 1998, 2000). According to Richard Feist’s reading of 
Weyl’s Das Kontinuum and Space-Time-Matter, Poincare’s predicativist philosophy led Weyl to 
modify Husserl’s semantics and ontology; concerning the concept of the natural number, Feist 
describes Weyl’s definition of it as an amalgam between Poincare’s view and Husserl’s 
approach (Feist 2002). 
Two years after the appearance of Das Kontinuum and Space-Time-Matter, the publication of 
“On the new foundational crisis in mathematics” (1921) suggested that yet another 
mathematician had shaped Weyl’s thought. Weyl was familiar with Brouwer’s topological work, 
at least from the early 1910s, as he referred to Brouwer’s “fundamental papers on topology” 
from 1909 in his paper on Riemann surfaces from 1913 (van Dalen 2013). There is historical 
evidence that the two have met in 1912, during Brouwer’s visit in Gottingen, but it remains 
unclear whether they discussed foundational issues at that time6.  
Weyl’s exposure to the echo chambers of Brouwer’s normative criticism of the foundations of 
mathematics dates back to 1919 when the two had met for the second time during a summer 
 
5 It should be noted that the developments in Weyl's philosophical stances have influenced his philosophy of 
physics as well (Ryckman 2005; Scholz 2001; Sigurdsson 1991). Norman Sieroka argues that some of the ideas Weyl 
developed in physics, such as the "agens theory" of matter, were influenced by his reading of Fichte and Husserl 
(Sieroka 2007), and Christophe Eckes points out that there exists a relation between Weyl's conception of 
apriorism and holism to the philosophical views of Husserl and Cassirer (Eckes 2018). Weyl's ambivalence in 
regards to the philosophy of physics is an intriguing topic that goes beyond the scope of the current paper but 
hopefully will be pursued in further research. 
6 There are opposing views in regards to whether Brouwer’s work in topology has roots in his philosophical views 
on intuitionistic mathematics. Some historians and mathematicians argue that Brouwer’s topological work is 
utterly separated from his intuitionistic endeavor, while others such as Arend Heyting and Dirk van Dalen remain 
unsure as to the unity or disunity in Brouwer’s work. The historians and mathematicians Jan van Mill and Teun 
Koetsier claim that the dividing line in Brouwer’s work does not run through topology and intuitionism, but 
separates his research to pre-1917 and post-1917 works (Koetsier and Van Mill 1997). They show that there is 
more that links Brouwer’s intuitionistic work to his topology in the years up to 1917 than separates it, and 
conclude that Brouwer’s topological work derive naturally from the same basic principles. 
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vacation in Engadin, and Weyl got to hear the story of Brouwer’s intuitionism first hand (van 
Dalen 1995, 2013; Hesseling 2003). Deeply influenced by Brouwer’s ideas, Weyl wrote the most 
advocative paper of Brouwer’s intuitionistic program, “On the new foundational crisis in 
mathematics” (Weyl 1921), which displayed a considerable deviation from the formalist 
framework to which Weyl was firmly committed as well as from the constructive approach 
Weyl embraced in Das Kontinuum, as an attempt to solve the difficulties Brouwer had raised.  
In the 1932 preface to Das Kontinuum, Weyl’s difficulty in properly addressing the foundational 
problem prevails, but he is less optimistic about the ability of constructive or intuitionistic 
methods to solve the conundrum. As he put it: 
“The point of view adopted in this monograph continues to strike me as a natural 
transitional stage in the development of foundational research. However, in the period 
since its appearance, my work has been superseded by two trends identified by the 
catchwords Intuitionism and Formalism. Still, this deeper grounding of the foundation 
has not led to an even moderately satisfying or defensible conclusion; things remain in a 
state of flux. […] It would not be possible, without radical rebuilding, to bring the 
content of this monograph into harmony with my current beliefs.” (Weyl 1918, 2–3) 
The indecisive nature of Weyl’s foundational perspective remains omnipresent in his later 
writings, as observed in his 1946 review paper, where he maintains his skepticism about our 
ability to confidently build up mathematics from solid foundations. Thus: 
“This history should make one thing clear: we are less certain than ever about the 
ultimate foundations of (logic and) mathematics, like everybody and everything in the 
world today, we have our "crisis". We have had it for nearly fifty years. Outwardly it 
does not seem to hamper our daily work, and yet I for one confess that it has had a 
considerable practical influence on my mathematical life: it directed my interests to 
fields I considered relatively "safe", and it has been a constant drain on the enthusiasm 
and determination with which I pursued my research work. The experience is probably 
shared by other mathematicians who are not indifferent to what their scientific 
endeavors mean in the context of man's whole caring and knowing, suffering and 
creative existence in the world.” (Weyl 1946, 11) 
Moreover, Weyl’s inclination towards constructive methods for rebuilding the foundations of 
mathematics did not disappear entirely over the years, as can be observed in one of his last 
papers “Axiomatic and Constructive Procedures in Mathematics,” written in 1954: 
“…the constructive transition to the continuum of real numbers is a serious affair... and I 
am bold enough to say that not even to this day are the logical issues involved in that 
constructive concept completely clarified and settled.” (Weyl 1954, 17) 
These citations from Weyl’s scattered works share a commonality: each embodies some aspect 
of self-reflection about his own shifting stances up to that point. In his 1932 note he 
acknowledged that a comprehensive endeavor is required in order to build a bridge between 
his old beliefs (presented in 1918) and his new ones; in 1946 he confessed that his uncertainty 
had influenced his own scientific interests; and in 1954 he referred to himself as “bold enough”, 
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since it requires fortitude to maintain an undecided position after so many years, and to still 
remain unsure. These are the words of a self-conscious person who is fully aware of his 
undecidedness and its problematic aspects as a practitioner in a scientific community. The 
frequent changes in Weyl’s mathematical views mark the trail he blazed in his fifty-year-long 
process of becoming ambivalent, living with his indecision, and attempting to resolve it.    
5. Confused from without (How do practitioners in the scientific community deal with 
Weyl’s ambivalence?) 
Mathematicians, philosophers, and historians of mathematics have tried to account for Weyl’s 
wavering foundational stances over the years. The mathematician and philosopher Solomon 
Feferman saw in Weyl’s Das Kontinuum a “substantial advance in the predicativist program” 
(Feferman 1988, 16). He ascribed to Weyl a predicativist position which derived, to a large 
extent, from Weyl’s criticism against the set-theoretical approach (that involved vicious circles) 
as well as his views about the irreducibility of the concept of the natural number and the 
necessity of explicit definitions for mathematical concepts such as sets and functions (Feferman 
1998). Even though only two years later Weyl had repudiated his ideas from Das Kontinuum in 
favor of Brouwer’s intuitionistic ideas, Feferman maintained that Weyl continued to regard the 
predicative approach as being of genuine value and that he “never really gave up the 
achievements of his 1918 monograph” (Feferman 2000, 181).  
The philosopher Norman Sieroka connects the shifts in Weyl’s foundational stances with the 
developments in his philosophical thought: Weyl’s objection to reduce mathematics to logic 
and set theory in Das Kontinuum derived from his leaning both on Fichte and Husserl, but 
during the 1920s he distinguished between the two, connecting Husserl’s phenomenology to 
Brouwer’s intuitionism and Fichte’s constructivism to formalism. After a brief affiliation with 
the “intuitionistic-phenomenological” approach, from 1925, Weyl came to believe that Fichte’s 
“formalistic-constructivist” approach “was on the right track” (Sieroka 2009, 90). Sieroka finds 
analogues between Weyl’s interdisciplinary lines of thought (mathematics, physics, and theory 
of subjectivity) and suggests that his analysis of Weyl’s “interdisciplinary intellectual 
neighborhoods” set the ground for “a more systematic elaboration of the role of 
transformations and invariances in the context of historiographical issues” (Sieroka 2019, 120). 
Biographical notes about Weyl written by mathematicians often dismiss his intuitionistic 
deliberations or ascribe them to his philosophical interests, which they consider as entirely 
separate from his mathematical work. Michael Atiyah’s short essay (Atiyah 2003) analyzes 
Weyl’s contributions to group theory and quantum mechanics while overtly ignoring his 
engagement with intuitionism and constructivism, and his ongoing ambivalence towards the 
foundational crisis. Max Newman dedicated a section he called “mathematical logic” to Weyl’s 
intuitionistic contemplations, but his piece ends with a functional tone regarding Weyl’s turn to 
intuitionism; as if Weyl’s only motivation was to make Brouwer’s mathematics accessible to 
other practitioners (Newman 1957, 323).  
On the other hand, the mathematician and historian Dirk van Dalen claims that Weyl’s 
commitment to intuitionism was not a mere infatuation or transitional stage. Throughout his 
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paper on Weyl’s intuitionistic mathematics, van Dalen portrays Weyl as a life-long admirer of 
Brouwer’s foundational approach that could never quite break with his earlier intuitionistic past 
(van Dalen 1995). According to van Dalen, the story of Weyl and Brouwer ends with their Zurich 
meeting, not long before Weyl died, where Weyl remarked sadly: “Brouwer, everything is 
unsteady again.”7 The philosopher John Bell (Bell 2000) tells a similar story of Weyl’s lasting 
fascination with intuitionism, specifically with the notion of the mathematical continuum.  
The historian of mathematics Erhard Scholz ascribes “historical rationality” to the moves of 
Hermann Weyl by taking a “non-systematic” perspective that attempts to elucidate Weyl’s 
changes of mind (Scholz 2000). Scholz describes Weyl’s inclination towards intuitionism as 
rooted in his philosophical considerations that were deeply influenced by Fichte’s approach to 
the concept of continuum and space. Even though the connection Weyl saw between 
intuitionism and the established structures of purely infinitesimal geometry may never exist 
outside his mind, Scholz maintains that “Illusions have often been historical driving forces, and 
if such closeness may be considered in retrospect as an illusion, we nevertheless have to take it 
into account, if we want to understand how Weyl became a protagonist in the spread of 
intuitionistic analysis” (Scholz 2000, 5). Scholz’s attempt to take into account Weyl’s inner 
“Besinnung” (translated as “reflection” or “contemplation”, see: (Scholz 2004, 14)) as part of his 
motivation to consider different foundational ideas is a perspective that I wish to broaden using 
Fisch’s concept of ambivalence.   
The retelling of Weyl’s story in light of Fisch’s notion of ambivalence suggests a view that 
enhances Bell’s, van Dalen’s, and Scholz’s readings; it adds to their interpretations a deeper 
philosophical aspect that is currently missing from their accounts and should not be overlooked 
if one wants to gain a better understating of Weyl’s shifting positions. Weyl’s ambivalence 
regarding the foundations of mathematics is a continuous thread that is woven into his writings 
throughout his life; thus, his motivation for changing his mind and the roots of his indecision 
play a significant role within the contours of the whole story. 
By addressing Weyl’s undecidedness as ambivalence in a Fischian manner, the rationale behind 
his constant change of mind unravels: as a practitioner that has been exposed to external 
criticism (not only in the form of Brouwer’s intuitionism, but also through the works of 
philosophers and mathematicians such as Kant, Fichte, Husserl, Poincare, the French 
intuitionists, and from 1927 Hilbert again), Weyl found himself engaged in normative self-
critical deliberations not only about whether mathematics can be built upon intuitionistic, 
constructive, or formalistic foundations but also about what it means to be an intuitionist, a 
formalist, or a constructivist.  
Developments in Brouwer’s intuitionism and Hilbert’s formalism have also contributed to 
Weyl’s foundational considerations. Neither theory remained stagnant over the years: 
Brouwer’s intuitionistic views had changed as he went from addressing the intuition of the 
continuum as an unanalyzable entity (Brouwer 1907) to introducing new concepts such as 
spreads and choice sequences in order to show how points on the continuum are identified 
with specific choice sequences (van Atten 2017; Brouwer 1918). A later development in 
 
7 The original quote appears in (van Dalen 1995, 166). 
 
 17 
Brouwer’s intuitionism occurred when his proof of fan theorem appeared in 1924, followed by 
the introduction of continuity theorem dealing with intuitionistic continuous functions 
(Brouwer 1924, 1927).  
Hilbert’s views on the foundations of analysis have also transformed during the first decades of 
the 20th century (Corry 2004), specifically his perspective regarding the logical basis required for 
rebuilding the foundations of mathematics. Hilbert’s quest for consistency proof in the early 
1900s had led him to abandon Dedekind’s logicism (Ferreirós 2009) and turn to Schröder’s 
conception of logic, even though it was not particularly suitable for Hilbert’s formalistic 
purposes (Zach 2019). In 1914, a few years after the publication of Russell and Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica, Hilbert became intensely involved with this work. He believed that the 
point of view developed there could lead to laying down the necessary logical foundations for 
his axiomatic treatment of mathematics (Mancosu 1999). Later on, however, he came to realize 
that other fundamental problems of axiomatics still remained unsolved. Therefore, he devoted 
the following years (1917-1921) to develop first-order logic and presented his new foundational 
approach in 1922 as a response to Brouwer’s intuitionism (Hilbert 1922; Zach 2007). During 
1926-1928 Hilbert’s program was further developed, as he introduced a distinction between 
real and ideal formulas, followed by his notions of ideal propositions (Hilbert 1926) and real 
propositions (Hilbert 1927). 
In 1925, as the debate gained increasing attention from practitioners inside and outside the 
field (Hesseling 2003), Weyl had published a paper in response to Hilbert’s reaction to 
Brouwer’s intuitionism. Despite the paper’s conciliatory tone, Weyl criticized Hilbert for his 
intention to “secure not the truth, but the consistency of the old analysis” (Weyl 1925, 136). 
Brouwer’s intuitionism offered a very substantial and attractive idea of mathematical truth 
(Dummett 1973, 1977); but when Brouwer’s fan theorem proof was published in 1924, it 
revealed a problematic aspect in the epistemological standards of Brouwer’s intuitionism, 
threatening the validity and justifiability of the intuitionistic view of mathematical truth (Epple 
2000). The realization that Brouwer’s intuitionism may not be able to adequately address the 
notion of mathematical truth as it promised, alongside with the developments in Hilbert’s 
program8 (Hilbert 1926; Sieg 1999), might have weakened Weyl’s confidence in Brouwer’s 
revisionist program and its core concepts, thereby contributing to his feelings of ambivalence. 
The feeling of ambivalence in Fisch’s model accounts for more than merely explaining the 
persistence of practitioners’ hesitant stances or indecisive acts; it primarily motivates for action. 
Driven by their ambivalence, practitioners are motivated to try and reconcile the stances they 
are torn between, creating new hybrid solutions. Even though these split accounts often 
 
8 As can be read from Sieg’s citation of Hilbert from 1923, Hilbert stated that the consistency problem is “no longer 
a question of proving that a system of infinitely many things is logically possible, but only of recognizing that it is 
impossible to derive a pair of formulas like A and ~A from the axioms extant in the formulas according to the rules 
of the logical calculus” (Sieg 1999, 40). Otherwise stated, Hilbert no longer searched for a proof of the logical 
possibility of an axiomatic system, but rather for a formal proof that an axiomatic system is non-contradicting. 
Moreover, it shows that Hilbert did not regard consistency proofs as indicating anything about mathematical 
existence, a view that coincides with the intuitionistic approach to consistency.   
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preserve the practitioner’s indecision, they serve to ambivalate leading practitioners within the 
discipline who attempt, in turn, to formulate less jarring accounts (Fisch 2017).  
Within the contours of Weyl’s story, I can point to at least two attempts to formulate similar 
hybridic solutions: one in Weyl’s 1918 monograph Das Kontinuum and another one three years 
later in “On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics”. In Das Kontinuum Weyl offered to 
subject the epsilon relation to type restriction in order to avoid the paradoxes of set theory, 
and to restrict the use of quantifiers in the set-theoretic comprehension scheme in order to 
avoid the vicious circle of impredicative definitions (Weyl 1918). The solution he proposed in 
“On the New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics” was a more radical one, since here Weyl 
embraced Brouwer’s choice sequences and completely forfeited arithmetically definable 
sequences, and the principle of excluded middle. Both attempts were to some extent misread, 
and even though Das Kontinuum is held these days in high esteem, it took the scientific 
community almost 60 years to properly read it (van Dalen 2013).  
The question of whether Weyl’s attempts are endowed with the same characteristics of 
hybridity and potential influence as Peacock’s case of “A Treatise on Algebra” is an intriguing 
question worth perusing in a study of its own. Nevertheless, the opportunity to address Weyl’s 
indecision as ambivalence sheds a different light not only on his hesitant stances but also on his 
motivations for developing new solutions to the foundational problem. 
Weyl's frequent changes of heart might also be attributed, at least partially, to a wider 
historical context of cultural shifts. In his monograph, Plato's Ghost: The Modernist 
Transformation of Mathematics, the mathematician and historian of mathematics Jeremy Gray 
portrays a connection between individuals' works and a broader social perspective on 
transitions in mathematics. Gray argues that between 1890 and 1930, the whole discipline of 
mathematics went through a cultural shift he refers to as "modernist transformation". 
Individual's works that convey genuine intellectual concerns are promoted by “significant 
groups of people with the right opportunities” who are able to spread them and thereby 
contribute to the overall process of cultural change (Gray 2008, 5). Cultural and political events 
such as the First World War also played a substantial role in shaping the mathematical 
landscape (Gray 2008, 406–7). Even though Gray's analysis mainly focuses on one direction, 
namely, how individual's works affect the process of transition (and not the other way around), 
it would be shortsighted to dismiss the way cultural and historical changes affected Weyl's 
views regarding certain theories, concepts, and ideas. As Dirk van Dalen points out, Weyl 
himself had characterized the tone of his 1921 paper as influenced by "the mood of excited 
times - the times immediately following the First World War" (van Dalen 1995; Weyl 1956). It 
goes beyond the scope of the current paper to comprehensively characterize the impact of 
cultural transitions on Weyl's changes of mind and vice versa, but hopefully the perspective 





6. Concluding Remarks  
Throughout this paper, I have attempted to present an alternative view to Hermann Weyl’s turn 
to intuitionism. My central argument is that a philosophical perspective of normative 
framework transitions is fundamentally missing from the current historical accounts of Weyl’s 
story. Specifically, I claim that the key to understanding Weyl’s undecidedness lies in 
Menachem Fisch’s notion of ambivalence. 
Fisch maintains that we are capable of becoming ambivalent, but not ambivalating ourselves 
towards our norms. Only a trusted criticism coming from without can change our whole point 
of view and induce a rational, justified transformation of our normative framework. The 
process of becoming and being ambivalent has no time restrictions and can last throughout a 
practitioner’s professional career. Moreover, there is no guarantee that ambivalence must 
eventually resolve in a clear decisive stance; a practitioner might remain ambivalent during his 
whole life, and Weyl is a case in point.  
Unlike other practitioners who may have experienced the same difficulties regarding the 
foundational crisis, Weyl expressed his prolonged search for a solution in his writings, explicitly 
articulating the problematic aspects of every mathematical theory he had considered. The 
continued tone of ambivalence present in his papers is not a common phenomenon within the 
mathematical landscape, and it was often attributed to his philosophical inclinations that also 
changed over the years. The philosophical perspective presented in this paper suggests ways of 
providing a different analysis of Weyl’s continuous undecidedness, taking into consideration the 
intrasubjective process of changing one’s normative framework. Weyl’s so-called shifting 
positions should be regarded only as symptoms of a much deeper, convoluted intrapersonal 
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